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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
Case No. 20010205-CA

v.

:

ERIC PINO,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance in
i
I

drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
(Supp. 2001), in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Lynn W. Davis presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress
alleging that the police officer's search violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures.

1

Standard of Review: "The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to
grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearlyerroneous standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a
measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the
facts." State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App.), cert denied, 916 P.2d 909
(Utah 1996).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with possession or use of
methamphetamine in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, and possession of drug
paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor. R. 21. Defendant filed a
motion to suppress evidence obtained during his arrest. R. 39-49. At the suppression
hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion. R. 66-67, 127:27-28.
At trial, the court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict as to Count II
of the information, dismissing that charge. R. 84-81. A jury convicted defendant as
charged in Count I. R. 104, 129:146-48. Defendant was sentenced to thirty-six months
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probation and ordered to complete a substance abuse program. R. 110-12, 128.
Defendant timely appeals his conviction. R. 118-19.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
While on patrol in the afternoon of May 19,1999, Officer Ron Hughes observed
defendant driving near the Greyhound Bus Depot in Provo. R. 129:66-67,78. Officer
Hughes initiated a computer check of defendant's license plate with the database for the

1

The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict and to the trial
court's ruling denying defendant's motion to suppress. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT
76,12, 12 P.3d 92; State v. Tetmeyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 1997).
In support of his claim, defendant cites the suppression and preliminary hearing
transcripts. See Br. of Aplt. at 3-6, 12-14, 16 (citing preliminary hearing transcript (R.
126:16-19, 25-28, 33, 36)). As neither party introduced the preliminary hearing transcript
during the suppression hearing it is not clear that the trial court reviewed the same in
ruling here. Most appellate courts (Utah has no rule), in reviewing the denial of a pretrial
motion to suppress evidence, will consider only evidence before the court at the
suppression hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, 978 F.2d 722, 724-725 (D.C. Cir.
1992); Baez v. State, 425 S.E.2d 885, 890 (Ga. App. 1992); State v. Ryder, 3125 N.W.2d
786, 788-789 (Iowa 1982); Aiken v. State, 647 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Md. App. 1994), cert,
denied, 651 A.2d 854 (Md. 1995); Commonwealth v. Powers, 398 A.2d 1013, 1014 (Pa.
1979); 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.7(d) (1996). While some appellate
courts will consider both pretrial and trial evidence in reviewing a pretrial ruling, they
generally do so in the context of affirming the trial court's pretrial ruling. United States v.
Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1021-1022 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 114 S.Ct. 575 (1993); United
States v. Martin, 982 F.2d 1236, 1239-1240 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Basey,
816 F.2d 980, 983 n.l (5th Cir. 1987); State v. Young, 576 So.2d 1048, 1054 n.l 1055
(La. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Duncan, 789 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). Contra
State v. Kong, 883 P.2d 686, 688 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1994) (reversal). Relying on this rule,
at least one court has held that the denial of a suppression motion may be affirmed on
appeal by relying on evidence admitted at the preliminary hearing. People v. Dennison,
378 N.E.2d 220, 222-223 (111. 1978). Thus, the principle unifying these cases is that an
appellate court may affirm, but will not reverse, a ruling based on evidence not before the
lower court at the time it ruled.
3

Utah Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). R. 129:67,78. Although defendant's
license plate bore a current registration decal, the check revealed that defendant's
registration had expired. R. 129:67.
Defendant pulled into the parking lot behind the bus depot and Officer Hughes
parked behind defendant. R. 129:67-68, 79. Officer Hughes approached the driver's side
door of defendant's vehicle and requested defendant's drivers license, registration, and
proof vehicle insurance. R. 129:68. Defendant handed Officer Hughes a Utah
identification card and stated that he had recently purchased the vehicle and had not yet
registered it in his name nor obtained insurance. Id. Officer Hughes returned to his
vehicle with the identification card, radioed dispatch to send a tow truck, and prepared to
issue a citation and impound defendant's vehicle. R, 129:69-70.
Officer Mark Robinson overheard Officer Hughes' radio communication with
dispatch and to insure officer safety, responded to the scene as a backup. R. 129:88.
Upon his arrival, Officer Robinson observed defendant seated in his vehicle and
recognized him from previous encounters. R. 129:89. After conversing with Officer
Hughes, Officer Robinson approached defendant's vehicle. R. 127:15 In response,
defendant exited his vehicle and came toward Officer Robinson, causing the officer to be
concerned for his safety. Id. Officer Robinson briefly conversed with defendant about
his prior drug problems. R. 127:17. Defendant denied any current drug use. Id.
Having finished filling out the citation and the impound paperwork, Officer
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Hughes gave defendant the citation and notified him that his vehicle was to be
impounded. R. 129:69-72. Then, Officer Hughes told defendant that he could take his
personal belongings out of the car before it was impounded. R. 129:72. Although
Officer Hughes did not expressly tell defendant he could leave, at trial Officer Hughes
testified that at that point, defendant was free to leave. R. 129:82. Defendant reached
down inside his vehicle and grabbed a small black gym bag located beside him and began
to leave. R. 129:72, 89-90.
The search. As defendant was preparing to leave, Officer Robinson asked
defendant "do you mind if I look in the bag?" R. 127:18; 129:72, 90. Defendant replied,
"I don't mind it at all" and he handed his bag to the officer. R. 127:18; 129:90. Inside
the bag, Officer Robinson discovered several small baggies consistent with those used to
package drugs. R.129:72-75, 91-94, 96, 100-01,106-07. Officer Hughes then searched
defendant's person, and subsequently caught him trying to drop a small plastic fuse box
also containing baggies, down the back of his shirt. R. 129:75-76, 92-93, 95-96. Some of
the baggies contained white powdery residue which later tested positive for
methamphetamine. R. 129:74,76, 100-05, 128-33. At trial, the officers testified that the
incident occurred in a drug free zone—within 1000 feet of a strip mall and a church. R.
129:85, 97,108-14.
The suppression hearing. Officer Robinson testified at the suppression hearing
that between a year to a year-and-a-half before the present incident, defendant had
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specifically threatened to kill him and other officers during a search of defendant's home.
R. 127:6-14, 20-21. Officer Robinson also testified that based on his experiences with
defendant, defendant's demeanor during previous encounters was unstable. R. 127:1516. On this occasion, Officer Robinson observed that defendant's eyes were glazed and
that his demeanor was unusually mellow yet unstable, which based upon the officer's
experience, indicated that defendant was under the influence of drugs. R. 127:16-17,2225. Additionally, defendant's large stature, defendant's act of exiting his vehicle toward
Officer Robinson as the officer was approaching the vehicle, defendant's act of reaching
down and grabbing his bag after being informed that his car would be impounded, and the
fact that the bag was large enough to conceal a weapon caused Officer Robinson to fear
for his and officer Hughes' safety. See R. 127:14-25.
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress drug
evidence obtained in a search of his bag following a routine traffic stop. Defendant's
claim fails for two reasons: 1) based on the correct test for determining the voluntariness
a consent to search as offered in United States v. Abbott and Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
defendant cannot claim that his consent was involuntarily given; and 2) the search was
not the result of prior illegal police conduct where the scope of the stop was not
expanded, the officer was justified in performing a protective frisk, and the event had deescalated to a level-one encounter. Accordingly, where the search was justified under
those exceptions to the warrant requirement, defendant's claim fails.
6

ARGUMENT
THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S BAG WAS
JUSTIFIED UNDER THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia discovered in the search of his bag and person.
Br. of Aplt. at 15. Defendant argues that the warrantless search violated his Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, contending that police
exceeded the scope of the traffic detention by asking to search his bag, and that the trial
court erred in ruling that the search was justified as a protective frisk. Br. of Aplt. at 810,15-17. Additionally, although raised for the first time on appeal, defendant argues
that his consent to search the bag was not voluntary and was obtained through a prior
illegal detention. Br. of Aplt. at 10-15. For the following reasons, defendant's claims
lack merit.
A.

Defendant failed to preserve his claim that his consent was
involuntary in the trial court; notwithstanding that failure,
defendant's consent to search was voluntary.

Defendant claims that his consent to search the bag was not freely and voluntarily
given. Br. of Aplt. at 20-25. Defendant's claims fail, however, for two reasons: 2)
defendant failed to preserve it in the trial court; and 2) defendant cannot show that his
consent was involuntarily offered.

7

1.

Waiver.

In his motion to suppress, defendant argued that his consent was the result of prior
illegal conduct by the police. R. 39-49. For the first time on appeal, defendant argues
that his consent to search was involuntary. See generally R. 127. Defendant argues no
exception to the preservation rule. See Br. of Aplt. at 10-15. "[W]here a defendant fails
to assert a particular ground for suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial
court, an appellate court will not consider that ground on appeal." State v. Carter, 101
P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985); see e.g., State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah App. 1990).
Moreover, "the failure to assert a particular ground in a pre-trial suppression motion
operates as a waiver of the right to challenge the subsequent admission of evidence on
that ground" Carter, 707 P.2d at 660 (quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly,
this Court should decline defendant's invitation to consider the voluntariness of his
consent.
2.

Defendant's consent was voluntary.

Notwithstanding defendant's failure to preserve his claim for appeal, his consent
was voluntary. Evidence seized in a consent search will be admissible in court if: (1) the
consent was voluntary, and (2) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of a
prior illegality. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990). In this case, defendant's
consent was voluntary and was not obtained as the result of a prior illegality.
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(i)

The standard.

On appeal, defendant argues that this Court's decision in State v. Ham, 910 P.2d
433 (Utah App. 1996), establishes the analytical framework for determining whether the
consent was voluntary. Aplt. Brf. at 11. Ham relies on language from United States v.
Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977), for the standard by which voluntariness of a
consent is analyzed. Quoting Abbott, the Court in Ham held that the following three
requirements must be met to establish that voluntary consent was given:
"(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was
'unequivocal and specific5 and 'freely and intelligently' given; (2) the
government must prove consent was given without duress or coercion,
express or implied; and (3) [when evaluating these first two standards, [ ]]
the courts indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence
that such rights were waived."
Ham, 910 P.2d at 439 (quoting Abbott, 546 F.2d at 885) (other citations omitted).
Although in Ham and in several other cases, this Court has employed the Abbott standard
in voluntariness determinations, the Utah Supreme Court has never adopted the Abbott
standard in assessing the voluntariness of a consent. See, e.g., State v. Genovesi, 871 P.2d
547, 551 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah App. 1993),
aff'd, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1996); State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 467 (Utah App. 1991);
State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122,127
(Utah App. 1991); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887-88 (Utah App. 1990); State v.
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Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990).2 Recently this Court applied the Abbott
standard found in Ham in State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, f 18, 17 P.3d 1135.
However, the Utah Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certiorari review on
that ground. See State v. Hansen, 26 P.3d 235 (Utah 2001).
Continued reliance on the Abbott standard is problematic because the third Abbott
requirement creating a presumption against waiver has since been rejected by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and is contrary to United States Supreme
Court precedent. The third prong of the Abbott standard as adopted in Ham and other
appellate decisions of this Court is that the court must "indulge every reasonable
presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there must be
convincing evidence that such rights were waived." Abbott, 546 F.2d at 885. Four years
later, however, the United States Supreme Court in Schneckloth held that "unlike those
constitutional guarantees that protect a defendant at trial, it cannot be said every
reasonable presumption ought to be indulged against voluntary relinquishment" of the
right against searches. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242-43 (1973)
(emphasis added). Citing Schneckloth, the Tenth Circuit abandoned the third Abbott
requirement in 1991, holding that "a district court determining the admissibility of

2

Although the Utah Court of Appeals applied the Abbott standard in Harmon, 854
P.2d at 1040, in affirming that decision, the Utah Supreme Court did not adopt that
standard. See State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1206-08 (Utah 1996). Instead, the Utah
Supreme Court focused solely on whether the consent was "the product of duress and
coercion." Id. at 1206.
10

evidence should not presume a defendant's consent to a search is either involuntary or
voluntary." United States v. Price, 925 F.2d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 1991) {citing
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 242-43); accord United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1500
(10th Cir. 1996). Given the Supreme Court's holding that such a presumption should not
be given and the Tenth Circuit's subsequent abandonment of the presumption, this Court
is constrained to reject the outdated standard as set forth in Abbott and Ham.
Consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Schneckloth, the
appropriate standard by which consent searches should be judged is best articulated as a
two part inquiry: First, the State must "prove that consent was given." Villano v. United
States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir. 1962). The consent must be "unequivocal and
specific." Abbott, 546 F.2d at 885. Second, the State must establish that the consent was
voluntary. In other words, the State must "prove consent was given without duress or
coercion, express or implied." Id. See Schneckloth, All U.S. at 225-29, 233.
Accordingly, a consent is constitutionally invalid and the search unreasonable "if under
all the circumstances it has appeared that the consent was not given voluntarily—that it
was coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission to a claim of lawful
authority." Id. at 233.
(ii)

Defendant voluntarily gave unequivocal and
specific consent to search his bag.

Here, although defendant concedes that his consent was specifically and
unequivocally given, he argues that it was not voluntary. See Br. of Aplt. at 11. The Utah
11

Supreme Court has identified the following factors which may show the consent was
voluntary, and not the product of duress or coercion: "1) the absence of a claim of
authority to search by the officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers;
3) a mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and 5) the
absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer." State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d
103,106 (Utah 1980).
A review of those factors in this case supports the trial court's conclusion that the
consent was in fact voluntary. Officer Robinson claimed no right to search, but simply
asked for consent to search. R. 127:18. There was no evidence that the officer used
deception or trickery to obtain consent, making neither promises nor threats. See
generally R. 129. Nor is there any evidence that Officer Robinson pulled out or
otherwise displayed his weapon. See id. Moreover, when Officer Robinson politely
asked if he could search defendant's bag, defendant cooperated by stating that "he did not
mind," voluntarily handing the bag to the officers. R. 127:18. Thus, defendant's consent
was voluntary.
(iii)

State v. Hansen and Ohio v. Robinette are
distinguishable from the instant case.

In support of his claim, defendant compares his case to State v. Hansen, 2000 UT
App 353,17 P.3d 1135, and Ohio v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio 1997). Br. of Aplt.
at 11-12. Notwithstanding their reliance on the incorrect third prong of the Abbott
standard—presumption against voluntariness, both Hansen and Robinette are
12

distinguishable from the present case.
In Hansen, the defendant was stopped for no insurance and for making an
improper lane change. Hansen, 2000 UTApp 353, \2. After issuing a warning to
defendant and returning defendant's drivers license and registration the officer asked
Hansen if he had any alcohol, weapons, or drugs in his vehicle. Id. at f4. Hansen replied
that he did not have any such items. Id. The officer then asked Hansen, "Do you mind if
I check?" Id. At trial, the officer testified that Hansen responded "Yes." Id. However,
the officer could not remember Hansen's exact response to his question. Id. at f 21.
Based on the ambiguity of the verbal exchange between Hansen and the officer, this
Court applied the presumption against waiver of a constitutional right and determined that
Hansen's consent was not voluntary. Id. atffl[19-21, 25.
Here, like Hansen Officer Robinson asked defendant, "Do you mind if I look in
the bag?" R. 127:18; 129:72, 90. However, unlike Hansen, defendant replied, "I don't
mind it at all" and he handed the bag to Officer Robinson. R. 127:18; 129:90.
Defendant's unequivocal answer to Officer Robinson's question and his act of then
handing the bag to the officer are significant distinguishing facts. Because the verbal
exchange between Officer Robinson and defendant, and defendant's act of handing the
bag to the officer are not ambiguous, there is no question that the consent was voluntary.
Thus Hansen does not apply to the instant case.
Defendant's reliance on Robinette is also misplaced. In Robinette, the officer
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stopped Robinette for speeding, issued him a verbal warning, returned his drivers licence
and then stated, "One question before you get gone [sic]: are you carrying any illegal
contraband in your car? Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?" Robinette,
685 N.E.2d at 764. When Robinette responded that he did not have any comtraband in the
car, the officer asked if he could search the vehicle. Id. Robinette answered "yes." Id.
The Ohio Supreme Court focused on the officer's statement "[o]ne question before you
get gone [sic], " determining that "[the officer's] words did not give Robinette any
indication that he was free to go, but rather implied just the opposite—that Robinette was
not free to go until he answered [the officer's] additional questions." Id. at 770.
Accordingly, the Robinette court held that because the officer wrongly detained Robinette
his consent was coerced. Id. at 771.
Robinette differs from the instant case because Officer Robinson's question, "Do
you mind if I look in the bag?" was in no way coercive. Moreover, unlike the officer's
question in Robinette, Officer Robinson's question did not prevent defendant from
responding in the negative and leaving. Thus, Robinette is inapplicable to the present
case.
B.

Defendant's consent to search his car was not obtained by police
exploitation of a prior illegality.

Having resolved that defendant's consent was voluntary, the Court must determine
whether the consent was obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality. See Arroyo,
796 P.2d at 688. Defendant claims that although the purpose of the stop v/as completed,
14

Officer Robinson impermissibly extended the detention by asking to search defendant's
bag. Br. of Aplt. at 14. When Officer Robinson asked this question, however, the
detention had already terminated.
"The touchstone of [an] analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular government invasion of a
citizen's personal security.'" Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,108-09 (1977)
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,19 (1968)). In other words, "[t]he Fourth
Amendment is n o t . . . a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but only against
unreasonable searches and seizures." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 681 (1985).
In evaluating the reasonableness of an investigative stop and detention as occurred here,
a dual inquiry applies. Id. The first question is "whether the officer's action was
justified at its inception," and the second is "whether it was reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Id. (quoting Terry,
392 U.S. at 20). See also State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-1132 (Utah 1994). This
Court also looks "to the totality of the circumstances present at the time of the stop to
determine if there was an objective basis for suspecting criminal activity." State v.
Rodriguez-Lopi, 954 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1998) (quoting State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d
137,141 (Utah App. 1997)).
Defendant does not assert that the instant stop was unjustified. Br. of Aplt. at 8.
Therefore, the issues here are (1) whether Officer Robinson exceeded the reasonable
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scope of the stop's primary traffic purpose when he asked defendant about his prior drug
problems preceding the traffic violations; (2) whether the subsequent Terry frisk of
defendant was justified by objective safety concerns; and (3) after defendant was free to
leave, whether the officer's request to search constituted a mere level one encounter.
1.

Questioning about defendant's prior drug usage did not
unreasonably expand the scope of the traffic stop.

It is well established that a "detention incident to a traffic stop 'must be temporary
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop/" Lopez, 873
P.2d at 1132 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)). Additionally, the
length and scope of the stop must be "'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances
which rendered its initiation permissible." Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20).
However, "a valid investigatory stop may include 'a request for identification and inquiry
concerning the suspicious conduct of the person detained." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1133
(quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981)). See also Utah Code
Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995) ("A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he
has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and an
explanation of his actions.").
This means that during a routine traffic stop, police may request a driver's license
and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation. However, once
the driver has produced a valid driver's license and evidence of entitlement to use the
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vehicle, 'he must be allowed to proceed on the his way, without being subject to further
delay by police for additional questioning. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting State v.
Robinson, 797 P.2d 431,435 (Utah App. 1990)). In a routine traffic stop, "investigative
questioning that further detains the driver must be supported by reasonable suspicion of
more serious criminal activity." Id. This is not to say, however, that mere questioning
constitutes either a search or a seizure. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,434 (1991)
("Since Terry, we have repeatedly held that mere police questioning does not constitute a
seizure."). See also United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e
reject any notion that a police officer's questioning, even on a subject unrelated to the
purpose of the stop, is itself a Fourth Amendment violation.").
Here, defendant claims that questioning about his prior and present drug usage
was unreasonable because Officer Robinson did not observe any behavior giving rise to
a reasonable suspicion of a drug usage. Br. of Aplt. at 9-10. This contention narrowly
overlooks Officer Robinson's observations about defendant's strange demeanor.
Specifically, the officer observed that defendant's eyes were glazed and his demeanor
was mellow yet unstable. See R. 127:16-17, 22-25. Based on the officer's experience,
this behavior reasonably suggested a possible drug offense. Id. See State v. RodriguezLopi, 954 P.2d at 1292 (recognizing court must consider "the totality of the
circumstances" at the time of the stop or detention to determine if there was an objective
basis for suspecting criminality); State v. Ottesen, 920 P.2d 183,185 (Utah App. 1996)
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(In determining the reasonableness of a given situation, "common sense and ordinary
human experience must govern over rigid criteria.") (quotations omitted)). Accordingly,
given the officer's observations of defendant's strange demeanor, his questions
concerning defendant's prior and present drug usage were reasonable.
However, even if the questioning is deemed objectively unreasonable, it was not
the questioning that lead to the discovery of methamphetamine in defendant's bag and on
his person—it was the subsequent protective frisk.
2.

The trial court correctly concluded that the protective
frisk revealing controlled substances in defendant's bag
and on his person, was objectively reasonable.

The circumstances surrounding the protective frisk here give rise to an objectively
reasonable suspicion that defendant was potentially dangerous. Officer Robinson
noticed defendant's suspicious demeanor, but did not observe defendant's bag until
defendant had learned that his car was to be impounded and was about to leave. See R.
127:15-17. Moreover, Officer Robinson was plainly aware that during the prior year,
defendant had specifically threatened his life. Accordingly, the trial court found that
performing a protective frisk after issuing a citation and impoundment record was
reasonable:
Well, it appears to me that if an investigatory officer's life has been
threatened by the defendant, and he has threatened to kill that offic er, and
the officer at the date in question still maintains that fear reasonably, that it
is proper to search a bag that would have been within a wingspan control of
the defendant. [Officer Robinson is] indicating that he had numerous
contacts with [defendant] over a period of time, that he was acquainted
18

with [defendant], [that the officer] did not deem [defendant] to be a stable
individual previously and had [the officer's] life threatened. [The officer
noted] [t]hat [defendant] is large of stature, [the officer] believed that
[defendant] was a bit out of it, [that defendant was experiencing] some
form of stupor, that [defendant] had a glaze in his eyes, [and] thought that
[defendant] might be under the influence of drugs. And when [defendant]
reached into the vehicle that [the officer] inquired of him. "May I search
the bag?" As [defendant] retrieved it, [the officer] testified that this
defendant said, "I don't mind at all." And it was within that bag that drug
paraphernalia was then discovered, and then evidently a Terry frisk [was
performed] after that of the defendant. Because of the personal threat to kill
the officer there is a basis upon which for officer's safety and security to
search a bag that may in fact contain a weapon.
R. 127:27-28.
The trial court's ruling should be upheld. Police are entitled to take reasonable
precautionary actions to ensure their safety during the course of a traffic investigation.
State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah App. 1998). Here, Officer Robinson's
objective safety concern was real and reasonable. The United States Supreme Court has
consistently recognized the danger facing police during traffic stops. In Maryland v.
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413 (1997), the Supreme Court observed that '[i]n 1994 alone,
there were 5,672 officer assaults and 11 officers killed during traffic pursuits and stops."
The Supreme Court has previously noted that approximately 30% of police shootings
occur when an officer approaches a suspect seated in a vehicle. Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032, 1049 n.13 (1983); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5
(1973) (FBI report indicates that 11 of 35 police officers murdered in a three-month
period were killed when the officers were making a traffic stop); 4 W. LaFave, Search
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and Seizure, § 9.5(a), 254-255 n.33 (3d. ed. 1996) (more officers are shot while
conducting field interrogations than while dealing with known felons, and 43% of officer
shootings that occurred pursuant to a vehicle stop take place after the initial contact has
been made). Utah law enforcement is not immune from the national trend. See, e.g.,
State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8ffi[2-5,994 P.2d 177 (passenger in traffic stop shot at officer
after ignoring repeated requests to show his hands); State v. Johnson, 784 P,2d 1135,
1137 (Utah 1989) (driver shot at officer without warning as officer approached vehicle).
The trial court correctly found that Officer Robinson articulated particularized
facts which gave him a reasonable belief that defendant was canying a weapon in his bag.
In his brief, defendant dissects the facts that confronted Officer Robinson the night of the
arrest and argues that these facts fail to support articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
See Br. of Aplt. at 16-17. "Looking at each fact in isolation . . . is not proper." State v.
Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah App. 1992). Rather, defendant must examine all the
facts and inferences viewed together. See id. Here, See R. 127:26-27. Specifically,
Officer Robinson testified that during a search of defendant's home the prior year,
defendant, in a fit of anger, expressly threatened to kill him and other officers. See R.
127:6-14,20-21; State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 661 (Utah App. 1993) (although not
determinative, a previous police encounter may be relevant to a suspicion that a suspect
might be presently dangerous, depending on the nature of the interaction). In addition,
the officer cited defendant's unstable demeanor during previous encounters, defendant's
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large stature, the officer's numerous encounters with defendant, defendant's present
demeanor including his glazed eyes and unstable demeanor which based upon the
officer's experience, indicated that defendant was under the influence of drugs,
defendant's act of exiting his vehicle toward Officer Robinson as the officer was
approaching, defendant's act of reaching down and grabbing his bag after being informed
that his car would be impounded, and the fact that the bag was large enough to conceal a
weapon, as reasons for suspecting that defendant was harboring a weapon in his bag. See
R. 127:14-25; White, 856 P.2d at 660 (an officer may rely on experience to fortify his
reasonable suspicion). Accordingly, the totality of the particularized facts articulated by
Officer Robinson led the officer to reasonably suspect that defendant may be armed.
Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that Officer Robinson was justified in
performing a protective frisk of defendant's bag. See Carter, 707 P.2d at 659.
3.

Because the traffic stop had de-escalated to a level-one
consensual encounter, the officer was justified in asking to
search defendant's bag.

The courts have recognized three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters
between law enforcement and the public: (1) consensual encounters in which the person
is free to leave, (2) brief investigatory stops based on articulable suspicion that the person
has committed or is about to commit a crime, and (3) arrests based on probable cause.
Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App. 55,110, 998 P.2d 274 {citing State v. Dietman, 739
P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1997) (per curiam)). The issue here, therefore, is whether Officer
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Hughes' issuance of the citation and impound record converted the level-two detention of
defendant into a level-one consensual encounter.
The Tenth Circuit has held that "'after an officer issues the citation and returns any
materials provided, the driver is illegally detained only if the driver has objectively
reasonable cause to believe that he or she is not free to leave.'" United States v. Anderson,
114 F.3d 1059,1064 (10th Cir. 1997) {quoting United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491,
1501 (10th Cir. 1996)). Defendant has shown no such cause.
A level-two detention converts to a level-one, consensual encounter if, "either
from the words of [the] officer or from the clear import of the circumstances," a
reasonable person would believe he or she is free to leave. State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d
1242,1244 (Utah 1994). Factors that suggest a detention exists, or in the converse, that a
detention has not ended, include "the threatening presence of several officers, the display
of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use
of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might
be compelled." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); accord State v.
Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah App. 1996); Anderson, 114 F.3d at 1059.
In this case, Officer Hughes issued defendant a citation and impound report. R.
129:68-72. Defendant was not surrounded by officers. R. 67 (Findings, f 67). Although
a second officer, Officer Robinson, arrived after Officer Hughes had walked back to his
car, Officer Robinson separately conversed with defendant while Officer Hughes was
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completing the paper work. R. 129:88-90. The record is silent as to whether Officer
Robinson was armed, but there is no indication that he used otherwise displayed his
weapon. See generally R. 129. Nor was there any evidence suggesting that he physically
touched defendant or used any means of coercion. See id. In short, Officer Hughes'
issuance of a citation and the impound report signaled the end of the detention such that a
reasonable person would feel free to leave.
Defendant focuses on the fact that Officer Hughes did not expressly state that
defendant was "free to leave." Br. of Aplt. at 9. The Fourth Amendment does not require
particular language, or words at all, to signal the end of a detention. See Higgins, 884
P.2d at 1244. Indeed, any requirement that an officer expressly state that defendant was
"free to leave" would be contrary to the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996). In that case, the High Court expressly
rejected as unrealistic any requirement that police officers "always inform detainees that
they are free to go before a consent to search may be deemed voluntary." Id. at 39-40.
Accordingly, Officer Hughes was not required to expressly inform defendant that
he was free to leave. The clear import of his actions in issuing a citation and impound
report then telling defendant to remove his personal items from the car before it was
impounded, was that defendant was free to leave. Contrary to defendant's claim, Officer
Robinson's subsequent request to search defendant's bag—which could not have taken
more than a few seconds—did not extend the level two detention. Officers are free to
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pose questions to the public and a citizen's decision to answer the question does not
escalate the encounter into a level two detention. See State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 768
(Utah App. 1990) (holding that a seizure did not occur by virtue of the officer's request
for identification), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).
In Patefield, an officer stopped a driver for a burnt out license plate bulb. 927 P.2d
at 656. After the officer gave the driver a verbal warning to repair the broken light, the
defendant offered to fix it. Id. at 656-57. The officer remained at the location, assisting
the driver by holding a flashlight. Id. at 656. When the driver opened the sliding door of
his van to retrieve a toolbox, the officer observed several open containers of beer in the
van. Id. A subsequent search of the van revealed marijuana. Id. at 651. This Court
identified the issue as "whether, when viewed from an objective standard, someone in
[the driver's] position would reasonably have felt free to leave after [the officer] gave the
equipment failure warning." Id. at 659. Although no testimony was given indicating
whether or not the defendant's driver's license was returned or that the defendant was
free to leave, the Court nevertheless concluded that a reasonable person would have felt
free to leave. Id. at 656, 659. In so concluding, the Court observed that nothing in the
facts suggested that the officer compelled the driver to repair the light. Id. at 659.3
Indeed, as the Court noted, "[t]he record [was] void of any evidence suggesting that [the
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The defendant in Patefield had conceded that the officer "meant only to issue a
verbal warning." 927 P.2d at 659.
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officer] 'use[d]... language or [a] tone of voice' demonstrating that [the driver] was
compelled to fix the light on the spot." Id. at 660 (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554)
(all but first bracket in original).
Likewise in this case, nothing in the facts suggests that Officer Robinson used
language or a tone of voice demonstrating that defendant was compelled to respond to his
question or consent to a search. Officer Robinson politely asked if defendant would mind
if he searched the bag, he did not make any threats or promises. R. 127:18. As explained
above, no show of force was made and the request was made after Officer Hughes told
defendant that he could take his personal belongings and leave. R. 129:72. As such, the
exchange was a consensual encounter in which defendant voluntarily chose to participate.
The two brief questions did not extend the detention. The stop had ceased and defendant
voluntarily consented to the questioning. Therefore, the evidence seized pursuant to the
consent search was not tainted by a prior illegality.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the
trial court's ruling denying defendant's motion to suppress.
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